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Policy Implications of lludget Deficit Targets 
Abstract 
I analyze ln this paper a financial program found commonly ln developing 
countries that are engaged in improving structural imbalances. Similar programs 
have also been adopted in industrialized countries, in the U.K. since 1980 and 
in the U.S. since 1984. A typical financial program consists of a target budget 
deficit, an independent monetary (domestic credit) policy, and the government 
budget constraint. For such a program, I ShOH that the endogeneity of the 
issuance of nominal bonds is not sufficient to satisfy both the government 
budget constraint and the deficit target. Such a program is feasible provided 
bonds are issued endogenously to satisfy the deficit target and either lump sum 
t~~es and/or discretionary spending are adjusted endogenously to satisfy the 
budget constraint. Lump sum taxes are not dissimilar from U.K. government 
receipts from North Sea oil and gas production or proceeds from selling 
government assets. In the absence of ready access to such receipts, if taxes 
are not raised and/or spending is not cut, the policy package Hill be infeasible 
as the government budget constraint cannot be satisfied. 
Recent policy packages and the resulting fiscal performances ln the U.K. 
and in the U.S. economies provide empirical support to the analytical result of 
this paper. In particular, bonds and discretionary government expenditure have 
been used as tHO endogenous policies satisfying the constraint on the budget 
deficit and the budget balance. In the ca~e of the U.K., increased receipts 
from the production of North Sea oil and gas in the early 1980s provided a 
temporary alternative to reducing government spending. 
Policy Implications of Budget Deficit Targets 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal authorities frequently react to macroeconomic imbalances by adopting 
policies aimed at reducing government budget deficits with a view to reducing 
aggregate demand and influencing other key variables in the economy.1 Such 
authorities in a growing number of developing countries adopted reduced budget 
deficit targets in the late 1970s and the 1980s. 2 Deficit targets involving 
gradual reductions several years ahead were introduced voluntarily by the 
authorities in the U.K. and in the U.S. in the 1980s. The U.K. government under 
llIrs. Margaret Thatcher introduced deficit targets as part of its ~Iedium Term 
Financial Strategy (llITFS) in the Jlarch 1980 budget. In the U. S. , although 
formal deficit reduction targets over several years \;ere enacted in 1985, a 
permanent statutory debt ceiling has existed since 1947. The cumulative effects 
of successive budget deficits meant that by 1958 the debt ceiling could not be 
satisfied without the U.S. Treasury reneging on some federal government 
obligations. As a result, between 1958 and 1985, U.S. Congress raised the 
statutory debt ceiling 45 times from an initial level of $275 billion to 
$2,078.7 billion. This rapid growth In the debt ceiling began to worry the U.S. 
Congress by mid-1980s. In 1984, Congress became concerned that the actual and 
projected high budgetary deficits as well as the debt-service ratio would 
lEconomists differ in opInIons on the precise macroeconomic effects of budget 
deficits. For a succinct discussion. see Yellen (1989). 
2[letween 1971 and 1988, /9 mainly developing country members of the 
International Jlonetary Fund (HIP) adopted economic programs averaging over five 
years in each country \>'ith the programs !lsHally requiring a reduced ratio of 
government budget deficits to gross domestic product. These programs were in 
the form of standby and extended standby arrangement facilities of the DIF, for 
a total of 412 program yea.rs. The U. K. \;as the only major industrialized 
country to have had such facilities in three years (197;,), 1977, and 19(8). Data 
derived from DIF Snrvev (various issues). 
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jeopardize the economic recovery that began in the previous year. Initially, 
policies I-lere adopted in the form of tCL'\: freeze I,hich postponed 11 ta.'{ 
reductions scheduled to take effect in that year and in the subsequent years. 
In the follol-ling year, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985 - - popularly knOl-lll as the Gramm- Rudman- lIoll ings lal-l - - '-las passed. This 
Act has been revised since, but the basic element of the lal-l requires achieving 
successively 10l-ler projected budget deficit levels and a balanced budget nOI-l by 
1993'": 
The def ici t reducing programs have all hall the follOlving common features. 
In the developing countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs 
requiring reduced budget deficits usually also specify domestic credit ceilings, 
thereby controlling the economy's money supply.3 In the U.K., the voluntary 
policy package introduced by the Thatcher government consisted of targeting both 
the budget deficit and the grOl-lth rate of money.-± In the U.S., the government 
policy targets the budget deficit level. But, because the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System independently sets the monetary 
policy, the federal governnlent must take the money supply as given exogenously. 
Thus, in all the examples of budget deficit targets, the fiscal authorities can 
decide to achieve the target and satisfy the government budget constraint by 
some combination of issuing bonds, raising tax rates that I-lill generate higher 
ta.'{ revenue, or reducing discretionary government spending. 
Examinations of the U.K. and U.S. data suggest that discretionary 
government expenditure has been de facto a second endogenous policy choice, in 
addition to endogenous bonds. Adoption of deficit reduction targets has 
3The relationship betl-leen domestic credit <lnd the money supply is described III 
sectioll 2. 
-!The monetary target I-las introduced I,ith a nel, to reducing the domestic 
inflation rate. 
contributed to trimming the budget deficit ratios In both countries (see 
Table 1). Reductions achieved in the U.K. economy are more drastic owing to the 
length of time over \;hich the deficit reduction policies have been maintained. 
The def icit rat io has been reduced sharply from ..L 6 percent of gross domest ic 
product in 1980 to 0.8 percent in 198/. necause this measure of deficit 
exaggerates the underlying achievements, I adjust the reported deficits to 
exclude from revenue government asset sale proceeds and royalties received from 
oil and gas explorations to provide a better indication of the underlying trend 
in the budget deficit. Even the adjusted deficit ratio indicates that the 
authorities have maintained a successful bndget deficit reduction program. The 
adjusted deficit ratio has been trimmed from 1.1 to 2.6 percent. Initially, 
because of improved tax: performances oh'ing to higher ta.'C receipts from oil and 
gas-related productions, the government expenditure remained high. nut, as the 
oil sector \;eakened in the more recent years, some expenditure cuts have also 
been made. In the U.S., the deficit ratio was 6.2 percent in 1983 but it was 
reduced to 3.3 percent in 1988. 5 This sharp reduction was accompanied by 
reduced government expenditure ratios and virtually unchanged tax performance. 
These fiscal outcomes lend empirical support to the theoretical result of this 
paper that successful deficit reductions are accompanied by reduced government 
spending \,:'hen the monetary policy is exogenously set. In the case of the U.K., 
increased tax receipts from production of l'\orth Sea oil and gas in the early 
1980s provided a temporary alternative to reducing government spending. 
:In the calculation of the deficit. 0p0ratioll of the Social Security Trust Funds 
have been consolidated with the central government. This is in conformity with 
their treatment in the U.S. budget presentation as ~ell as with budget data for 
the U.K. discussed previously. 
Tahle 1. Select.ed Consolidated Central Government lIudgetary Data 
of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 1971-881 
Average for 
Ifl74-7fl 1980 1981 19K'1. 19R1 19R'1 19Rfi 1980 \0R7 InKS 
Total revenue 
II.K. 
II.S.A. 
and grants 
JI.II 
19.4 
:16.0 
20.9 
Un 
~lG. 9 
21.8 
perr.rnt of gross dOlllest.ic Ilrodllr.t.) 
:19.3 
21. :1 
18.1 
20.0 
:18.1 
10.7 
18.1 
20.3 
38.1 
H1.8 
:17 .5 
20.7 20.2 
Tax re\'ellue 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
30.0 
18.0 
31.0 
ELl 
31.9 
19.8 
:14.2 
19.3 
:13. I 
17.7 
33.5 
17.7 
33.5 
18.2 
34.0 
17.9 
33.4 
18.8 18.6 
lILher revellue alld grilllts 
U. K. 
U.S.A. 
4.4 
1.4 
5.0 
1.8 
5.0 
2.0 
5. I 
2.0 
5.0 
2.3 
1.8 
2.0 
4.6 
2.1 
4. I 
1.9 
4.1 
1.9 1.6 
Total expenditure and lIet lending 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
39.8 
21.9 
40.6 
23.8 
41.6 
24.5 
42.7 
25.4 
12.5 
26.2 
41.5 
21.6 
41.3 
25.7 
40.0 
24.9 
38.3 
21.0 23.5 
Of which: 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
interest payments 
3.5 
1.7 
4.1 
2.4 
4.2 
2.7 
4.0 
3.1 
4.0 
3.3 
1.1 
3.4 
4.1 
3.9 
4.1 
3.8 
4.0 
3.6 :1.5 
lIvllrall Ildicit:1 
U.K. 
U.K. (adju:;tcdp 
U.S.A. 
- 5.1 
-7.2 
- 2.5 
-4.0 
-7. I 
- 2.9 
- II. 7 
- G.8 
- 2.7 
- :1.1 
- 5.7 
- 4. 1 
- 4 .'1 
- 6. 5 
- 6. 2 
- :1. 2 
- 5.2 
- 4 .9 
-:3. 2 
- 5.2 
- 5.4 
-1.9 
- 3.73 
- 5.1 
- 0.8 
- 2.63 
- 3.3 -:3.3 
MemorandnlU items: 
lIlIt.:;t.andill~ deht 
U.K. ~elld·llarch) 
U.S.A. (elld- of- period) 
4!J..I 
27.8 
Illi. 3 
28.5 
11:3. (i 
28.4 
,lUi 
31.:\ 
·16.0 
36.3 
117.6 
37.3 
'17.1 
110.0 
117.7 
12.1 43. f t 43.7 
(: ross domest ic prodllct 
U.K. (Tn billions of pOlllld:;) 
U.S.A. (fll billions of dollar:;) 
1:17 .9 
1,8:l!J.3 
:2:10.6 
2,619.0 
25'1. 8 
2,9:17.3 
277 .2 
3,088.:3 
:302.0 
3,273.2 
321.4 
3,(i47.0 
15:\.7 
3,009.2 
377 .5 
1I,lfi:J.3 
408.6 
4,407.8 4,759.6 
SOllrces: fntenliltional Monetary 1'lllld, GOVr.l'JIIIII~nt. rin<lIH:r. St.atistil:s Yl'arhonk (198-1, 1987, allli 1989). 
U.K. yrar-cntling llecemlJr.r 31, and U.S. ycar-ending Jllne 3D throllgh 1976 and Scptcmher 30 t.hereafter.
 
Il if fers f 1'0111 t.he report.l'd def icit in L1lll pre\' iOilS I inc by t.he <111101111 t 0 f asset sales and royal t. ies, wh ieh is treated now as a spec iaL
 
financing itelll rather than a sOllrce of govcrnmellt revcnue. 
Assnmed royalties to rcmain at t.he 1985 level of U.K. £2.5 billion. 
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Literature on the government budget constraint has considered mainly the 
consequences of recognizing a government budget constraint in the standard 
macroeconomic models. A seminal paper by lliinder and SOlOlv (1973), follOlving 
the pioneering lvorks of Ott and Ott (106:'5) and Christ (1961; 1968) earlier, 
established the fact that the government cannot independently set ta.,<:es and 
government spending and control the issuance of money and bonds to the private 
sector. The government budget constraint requires that one of these variables 
must be endogenously set. In a related literature, Tobin and lluiter (1976) have 
shown that constancy of real public spending inclusive of debt interest is 
compatible Ivith the dynamic stability of pure bond finance. 6 This necessarily 
implies that the government glves up an additional degree of freedom to choose 
its policy variables independently. I make this point explicit by extending the 
standard government budget constraint Iitenlture Ivi th an additional constraint 
in the form of a target budget deficit. The deficit target ensures that the 
path of the real bond stock cannot explode because the target level implies a 
fixed path for government spending inclusive of interest payments. This is the 
crucial mechanism for dynamic stability in optimizing and ad hoc extended IS/LM 
models. 
I sholv that the endogeneity of the issuance of nominal bonds is not 
sufficient to satisfy both the government budget constraint and the deficit 
target. Endogenous bonds will satisfy the deficit target, but an additional 
policy instrument must be used to satisfy the government budget constraint. If 
monetary grOlvth rate is not also subject to a target, this Ivill usually mean the 
6The usual result in dynamic IS/L31 models with a Phillips curve is that 
constancy of real public spending inclusive of debt interest is compatihle with 
stability of pure bonu finance but not: snfficient for it. The determinant of 
the relevant Jacobian matrix has the right sign for stability, but the sign of 
the trace is ambiguous. 
government endogenously selects either tax rates: government spending: or the 
issuance of money to satisfy its budget constraint. In countries where the 
central bank independently sets the monetary policy, such as in the U.S., the 
choice is limited to endogenously choosing tc"LX rates or government spending. 
Given also the limitations on governments to freely set the tax rates, the 
difficulty ln the developing countries of improving tax collections through more 
efficient tax administration or altering nondiscretionary government spending, 
the only choice variable remains the discretionary part of government spending. 
Thus, a policy package involving a target budget deficit: an independent path 
for the money supply, and no ta.x increases requires the fiscal authorities to 
issue bonds and adjust discretionary government spending endogenously. The 
introduction of a budget deficit target requires nOI, tl,O: not one, endogenous 
government policy variables. 
Although there has been no publishell literature dealing l-lith the choice of 
government policies "hen budget deficits are targeted, policymakers and 
international monetary officials that advise governments to adopt policy 
packages involving deficit targets have been dealing l-lith the issues as they 
have occurred. Clear understanding by the fiscal authorities of the 
implications of introducing and then luaintaining such deficit targets will 
prevent unpleasant surprises. Recognition that maintaining 101, government 
budget def icits ,-lith a viel-l to avert ing macroeconomic imbalances and providing 
conditions for sustainell economic grol"th I,ill require cuts in discretionary 
expenditure in order to balance the bndget "ill provide a better environment for 
careful selection of expenditure programs. At present: countries "ith chronic 
needs for balance of payments support from tile Dlf require continued access to 
its credit facilities, and so these countries must satisfy any budget deficit 
6
 
targets agreed upon mutually. The DIF progl"C\.ms only specify an overall budget 
deficit target to avoid the appearance of blatant political interference in the 
allocation of government resources among competing demands by different groups 
within a country. The country authorities must then decide how to achieve the 
target budget def icits. As the analyt ical result shOl':s belOlv, any def icit 
target can be met by new bond issues, but developing countries \vith nIF programs 
in place must adjust government spellJing to satisfy budget constraints while 
they continue maintaining independent dOluestic credit ceilings. 7 Political 
difficulties in cutting expenditures on social programs make it almost certain 
that these countries \vill first trim prograullued capital or capital maintenance 
expenditures. The temporary gains made in 10l,:er budget deficits are lost \vhen 
countries are no longer subjected to Dlf moui taring. \~hen the balance of 
payments difficulties become less serious. these COllntries expand expenditures 
in curtailed areas to prevent further deterioration in their capital stock and 
thereby raise the budget def ici t I,:i th eventual re- emergence of macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
The process that ensures target budget deficits are satisfied is also 
similar in the U.K. and in the U.S. In the U.K .. successive budget deficit 
targets I"ere satisf ied initially by increased revenue flOlvs from the North Sea 
oil and gas production. Proceeds from selling government assets also helped to 
l0'ver the published deficits and contributed to halting the rapid grmvth in the 
consolidated central government debt. In recent years. as the oil sector 
I.;eakened and tax revenue performance dcteriora,tC'll ~ the government reduced 
7The policy package raises an interest ing pl"oblE'IU for policymakers and advisors. 
The choice of domestic credit ceilings amI endogenous issuance of bonds to 
satisfy budget deficits may not clear the of tell thin ?;overnment securities 
markets as the independent path for cretlits ~ill resutt generally in a market 
interest rate different from the government securities market-clearing interest 
rate. 
-
I 
expenditures to satisfy its budget cOll~traint. In the U.S., the lalV provides 
for an automatic trigger mechanism in the form of sequestration involving 
projected expenditure cuts to facilitate achieving projected budget deficit 
levels. Sequestration is an automatic deficit-reuuction procedure established 
by the U.S. Congress in 1985 and it applies if a projected deficit exceeds the 
target alllount in the Act. In this tougher budget enforcement process, the 
President presents a budget \~ith a lleficit aimed at the target deficit by making 
changes in any of revenue or expenditure. S Congress has betlVeen January and 
September to make any changes. If, Oll September 1, Congress does not agree on 
the target deficit figure, the President has to issue the Sequester Order. Then 
Congress has until October 1 to unllo any seClllestration the President says he 
,~ill do. If no agreement is reached beth'een Congress and the President, the 
Sequester Order is implemented Oil all lloll-exempted government expenditures. 
Congress has nolV exempted t\\o- thirds of goverllment expenditure from any 
Sequester Order and introducell "creative" accoullting techniques9 that have 
diminished the effectiveness of the deficit targets. Nevertheless, the process 
raises the deficit issue annually for puillic discussions. Also, through the 
provision of the Sequester Order, it is recogllized that government expenditures 
may have to be adjusted in order to satisfy the governulent budget constraint, 
IVhile endogenous issue of bonds ~ill satisfy the deficit target. 
The analytical result presented in this paper has an important message for 
the current budgetary debate in tile U.S.A. us well as for debates in developing 
8Note, the emphasis is on cuts to dchieve budget llef icits rather than satisfying 
the government budget constraint. 
9Creative accounting techniques include the inclusion of the Social Security 
Trust Funds and the exclusioll of Postal System. as ~ell as the creation of a 
shell company to borrolV for the purpose of tite sayings and loans bailout, ,.ith a 
vie,~ to obtaining a smaller proj ected hudget llef ic it to minimize the application 
of the Sequester Order. 
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countries. If the President \;ill not accept ta.\: increases and the Congress \"i11 
not accept cuts In discretionary government spending, reduced budget deficits as 
required by the Gramm- Rudman-Hollings lCl\; cannot be achieved. Attempts by these 
t,;o branches of the U. S. government to sho\{ that the la,{ is sat isf ied by 
creative accounting will not reduce the large budget deficits. In the 
developing countries that adopt IMP-supported financial programs, polic~uakers 
and the political leadership must understand that budget deficit reductions 
necessarily imply sustained expenditure Cilts or improved government receipts 
through better tax administration. If pro::;pects for higher ta.'{ receipts are 
slim, then there is no alternative to reducillg discretionary government spending 
short of reneging on outstanding govel~nlent debt or money financing with the 
prospect of rapid inflation rates. Therefore: in countries that have serious 
structural imbalances, political leadel'ship::; need to prepare the voters 
psychologically for sustained cuts in government spending. This may prevent 
unpleasant surprises for governments that seriously attempt to reduce budget 
deficits. The dmmfall of the Seaga government in Jamaica in the 1989 general 
election and the repeated coup attempts in Nigeria against the Dabandiga 
government are t,,;o examples of papillar response::; to successful reduct ions of 
budget deficits obtained In periods of c\'i:-;i::; by drastic reductions in 
discretionary government spending. .\ better appl'8ciat ion of the policy 
limitations imposed by the typica.l financial program \,rill facilitate early 
attempts at gradual reductions in discn~tiollttry government spending that may 
prevent "knee-jerk" reactions by the voters. 
I have organized the paper a,s fo1101';::3. III section 2, I specify a financial 
program consisting of a government budget con:)traint, a budget deficit target, 
and an independent path for the money snpply. In sect ion :3, I describe the 
private economy \,.hich simllltaneollsly interacts h'ith the financial program of the 
9
 
government sector to determine the macroeconomIC outcomes. The private sector 
consists of market efficiency conditions for money, capital, and 
interest-bearing securities and the goods market-clearing condition. In section 
4 and in the Appendix, I address the question of the feasibility of the 
financial program by identifying the policy variables that must be endogenously 
dotermined to satisfy the financial program. I demonstrate that the feasibility 
is nontrivial by establishing that the economic variables have unique values 
both in the steady state and along the dynamic convergent path. Finally, I make 
concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. A Financial Program 
I address the issues discussed in the preVIOUS section as the feasibility 
of a financial program consisting of a government budget constraint, a budget 
deficit target, and an independent path for the money supply. I analyze such a 
program In a closed economy Ivhere (a) the government is not engaged in 
investment expenditures and (b) the government's revenues are generated 
costlessly from the issuance of base money, interest-bearing securities issued 
as perpetuity bonds, and the collection of lump sum and marginal t~~es on 
private incomes. 
Because the government budget deficit is equal to the excess of government 
spending plus net interest payments over tax revenue, the government budget 
constraint is simply the requirement that any deficit must be financed either by 
issuing money or bonds. At each instant, this requirement implies that 
g + (l-t)eb - T - tf(k) =m + q& + (m+qb)7. (1) 
The left hand side of this equation is the real budget deficit Ivhile the right 
side is an indication that this deficit may be financed by either issuing real 
money (~jP) or real bonds (qOjP). The variables are defined as follows: 
10
 
g = real government spending, t = marginal t~x rate, e = nominal coupon payment 
on a bond, b =HIP = real bonds, H = number of bonds, P = price of goods, 
T = lump sum tax, f(k) = production as a function of capital to labor ratio (k), 
m=jI/P = real money balance, q = price of a real bond (b), and 10 =PIP = fully 
anticipated rate of inflation. In this specification of the government budget, 
government policy decisions relate to five variables. These are real government 
spending (g), real t~xes (t and T), monetary policy (~I), and bond issues (H). 
Literature addressing government budget constraint has nOI~ established that 
at most four of these preceding policy variables may be chosen independently and 
the fifth then determined to balance the government budget, given the structure 
of the economy and its agents' preferences. The second specification in a 
financial program involving an additional constraint imposed through a 
restriction on the size of the budget deficit I~ill place a further limitation on 
the government's ability to choose freely its policy variables. It does not 
matter analytically whether this restriction on deficit is specified in levels 
or in ratio to gross domestic product. Consider 
g + (1- t) eb - T - tf (k) = Rf (k), R > O. (2) 
Equation (2) indicates that the budget deficit ratio is required to be some 
arbitrary ratio R. This type of formulation is more common In the DIF- supported 
financial programs introduced In the developing countries. In the U.K., the 
UTFS includes a deficit target such as (2) with R declining over time. In the 
U. S., the Gramm- Rudman- Hollings la,~ targets reductions initially in the forecast 
deficit levels and R = 0 in fiscal year 1993. Equation (2) may be used In 
analyzing the feasihilitv of all financial programs, including the U.S. program. 
Finally, an independent monetary policy requires specifying a path for the 
money supply. If nominal money gro\,s at a constant rate B and at the initial 
11
 
date the outstanding nominal money stock (110 ) is predetermined, then real money 
balances groH according to 
m= (B- iT)m. (3) 
In the developing countries with IMF programs, the target is specified on 
domestic credits rather than on money supply directly. But, by assumption 1n 
this paper, monetary institutions can not have any foreign assets or 
liabilities. So, domestic credit equals to total liabilities plus net worth. 
Since total assets must equal total liabilities plus net \Vorth of all monetary 
institutions, and the money supply is only a subset of total liabilities, 
equation (3) remains useful in addressing the question of setting a ceiling on 
domestic credits. In the U.K., B has been specified for inside money as 'iell 
as, since 1984, outside money (MO) that is close to the definition of JI in this 
paper. The JITFS specified a declining B over time. In the U. S., B is 
determined by decisions taken by the FOMC of the Federal Reserve System and it 
is not directly controlled by the fiscal authorities. 
3. The Private Economy 
A financial program consisting of equations (1) to (3) 1S satisfied by the 
simultaneous interactions with private behavioral equations as \VeIl as the goods 
market-clearing condition. A Sidrauski-Brock optimizing model over an infinite 
horizon and under perfect foresight provides the following familiar conditions 
for private behavior (see llegg and Haque (1984) or Fischer (1979)): 
Money market: Um = Uc(r+/i) (4) 
Capital market: (l-t)f/(k) = l' + 0, and (5) 
Euler equation: - l\/Uc = r - 6 (6) 
Notations U and U denote marginal utility of money (m) and consumption (c) , III c 
respectively. r is the real implicit return on long bonds, 6 is the rate of 
I 
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capital depreciation, f'(k) is the marginal product of capital, and ¢ is the 
pure rate of time preference. The preceding optimal behavioral equations are 
augmented by the following securities market efficiency condition when 
government securities are introduced as an alternative form of financial assets 
in the private portfolio: 
q/q + (l-t)e/q = r + ~. (7) 
To analyze the feasibility of the financial program specified in Section 2, 
complete the model specification by assuming that the goods market clears. 
That is, output is divided among private and government consumption and gross 
investment as in equation (8). 
f(k) = c + g + ~ + ok. (8) 
4. The Feasibility Problem 
The feasibility of the financial program is assured if the model 
represented by equations (1) to (8) has a unique fonmrd-looking path as its 
solution. The necessary and sufficient conditions for this path being unique 
are that there exist unique steady state values, a convergent subspace In the 
equations system that describes the dynamic evolution of the economy, and an 
exact number of initial conditions to tie dOl{n a unique point in the convergent 
subspace. 
Denote the steady state values by superscript * I assume the real money 
stock is constant in the steady state so the perfectly anticipated inflation 
rate equals the rate of nominal money growth (see equation 3) -- i.e., 
~ * = (). (9) 
From equation (6), the real interest rate is equal to the rate of pure time 
discount: 
r * = ¢ (10) 
because I assume real consumption and real money balances are constant. 
Equation (5) then implies 
(l-t)f/(k)* = 9 + 0 (11) 
and so this modified golden rule establishes a unique capital stock. Because 
the nominal interest rate (9 + B) and the coupon payment on bonds (e) are 
constant, the bond price q * must be constant. Indeed, from equation (7), 
q * = (l-t)ej(¢+B). (12) 
Since real \,realth must be constant, and q * is constant , it follmis that 
]) = O. (13) 
The expression for the goods market clearing condition is: 
* * *f(k ) = c + g + ok (14) 
and it determines a unIque private consumption level c * , given the level of real 
public spending and the rate of capital depreciation. 1o 
*With a unique real consumption (c ), demand for real money balances (m*) is 
then solved from the money market condition (15) (obtained from equation (4)) . 
* * * * Um(c ,m )jUc(c ,m ) = ¢ + B. (15) 
But, because this condition is nonlinear, m * may have multiple solutions. The 
follo\iing analysis establishes that, provided money and consumption are normal 
or inferior goods and remain so for all feasible solutions, then the money 
market condition solves for a unique ill. * The slope of the money market 
condition in the (c,m)-plane is 
(16)
 
2\ihere J1 == (U U -U U )jU­
') 
and J == (U U - U U) jU .em c cc ill C 2 mill c em ill c 
lOCondition (14) also ShOliS that private consumption in the steady state IS 
positive provided that output net of capital depreciation exceeds public 
consumption of goods and services. 
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Both J1 and J2 are evaluated at their steady state values. Restrictions J1 > 0 
> J2 ensure money and consumption are normal goods (see Fischer, 1979). Thus, 
the slope dm*Ide * is negative. Figures 1 and 2 show the graph for the money 
market condition, under the assumption of both normal or inferior goods. In tlW 
possible cases, given a unique c * = c the money market condition provides a 
o 
unique m * = mo. 
Figure 1 FiCTureo 2 
,)". 
m I 
"..
Jloney m 
\ 
\. /Money
I market \ -/ market 
/ condition m* =m '''C condition* m =m ;-.-------;o o 1-1---------:.1'
.//t 't "~ 
o c * =c c o c *=c co o 
Money and consumption are normal Either money or consumption is an 
goods or both are inferior. inferior good. 
Thus, even though the money market condition is nonlinear, m * is unique under 
the standard assumption that money and consumption goods are normal. 
There remain expressions for the government budget constraint and the 
budget deficit targets: 
m*B = o(j ­ 7 - tf(k*) + 9(1-t)eb*I(¢+B) (17) 
Rf(k ) * = b(j ­ 7 - tf(k*) + (l-t)eb* (18) 
* * * The knowledge of k , m , q and the constant parameters is sufficient to solve 
for a unique real bond stock b * from the government budget constraint, 
simultaneously satisfying itself and the private sector's optimal behavioral 
equations. The real bond stock thus obtained must be unique precisely because 
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the equation is linear in the UnknO\in .11 HOI{ever, unique values of the capital 
stock and the number of bonds \{ill not generally satisfy the steady state 
version of the real budget deficit target, equation (18). Hence, given a real 
budget deficit target, it is not generally feasible to set independent paths for 
government spending, taxes, and the money supply. At least one must be 
determined endogenously, together "ith the number of bonds. If the marginal t~x 
rate is specified as an endogenous policy variable, then it is not possible to 
rule out multiple perfect foresight paths because the steady state values are 
not unique In general. Instead, either real government spending or lump sum 
taxes must be made endogenous. In the formulation of this paper, these t\iO have 
qualitatively similar steady state and dynamic stability properties because 
government spending does not enter the utility function in a nonlinear fashion. 
To s1101,1 hOl,l a real stock of bonds b * and lump sum t~x T * or discretionary 
government spending g* are chosen to balance the government budget and satisfy 
the budget deficit target, substitute for T or g from the government budget 
constraint into (17) to obtain 
* * * * Rf(k) = 8(m + q b ). (19) 
* * * * 1{ith k , m , q already solved, the preceding equation determines b gIven the 
* In particular,steady state fiscal deficit Rf(k). 
** Rf (k ) * * b = [ - m ]/q . 
8 
By substituting this unIque value of b * In the government budget constraint 
(16), the follo"ing equation is obtained: 
* * * g + ¢Rf(k )/8 = (9 + 8)m + T + tf(k ). 
IlFrom equation (17), the real bond stock is posItIve if total government 
revenue, inclusive of inflation tax, exceeds go\'ernment expenditure on goods and 
services. At an intuitive level, a positive real bond stock consistent "ith a 
steady state is possible if the government's t~~ revenue is sufficient to 
finance interest payments on a constant real stock of perpetuity bonds. 
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This equation then determines a unique g * or T * to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. 
The establishment of unique steady state values in the preceding analyses 
confirms that a financial program similar to the MTFS in the U.K., the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction program in the U.S., and the 
BIF- supported programs in developing countries are feasible with bond issues and 
lump sum taxation or government spending as two simultaneous endogenous policy 
decisions. 12 I show in the Appendix that dynamic stability is ensured for an 
optimizing monetary model in which lump sum taxes or discretionary government 
spending change endogenously to satisfy the government budget balance and, gIven 
this, the bond issues are endogenous to satisfy the budget deficit target. In 
this sense, something akin to the MTFS, the Gramm- Rudman- Hollings law, and DIF 
programs in developing countries are desirable. The budget deficit target 
ensures that the real bond stock cannot explode because it implies a fixed path 
for government spending inclusive of interest payments. This is the crucial 
mechanism for dynamic stability in this framel.;ork, as is the case in ad hoc 
extended IS/UI models .13 
12This feasibility will not in general extend to the case of indexed coupon 
payments on government bonds. The compensation offered to economic*a~ents for 
inflation implies that there is no inflation t~~ on bonds (i.e., 8q b does not 
appear in equation (19)). This means that in the steady state the inflation tax 
on money (8m)* must equal the real budget deficit Hhich in turn must equal 
* * *Rf (k ). Vith k , m , and 8 follo\,Iing a constant path, R cannot then be an 
exogenous variable. 
13When coupon values are fixed in nominal terms, Haque (1985) shaHS that simple 
endogenous bond finance in optiIllizin~ monetary ~ro\.;th models of the type adopted 
in this paper are dynamically unstable: a similar result can also be derived 
with extended IS/LM models. 
17
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
I analyzed in this paper a typical financial program found commonly in 
developing countries that are engaged in improving structural imbalances with 
assistance from the International ~Ionetary Fund. Similar programs have also 
been adopted in industrialized countries, in the United Kingdom since 1980 and 
in the United States since 1984. The typical financial program consists of a 
target budget deficit, an independent monetary or domestic credit policy, and a 
government budget constraint. By considering a private sector whose behavioral 
equations are derived from an optimizing monetary gro\vth model, I show that such 
a financial program is feasible, provided bonds are issued endogenously to 
satisfy the budget deficit target and either lump sum t~xes and/or discretionary 
government spending are adjusted endogenously to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. Lump sum t~xes are not dissimilar from U.K. government receipts 
from North Sea oil and gas production or proceeds from selling government 
assets. But most countries with a financial program do not have ready access to 
such receipts, so they must use discretionary government spending and issue 
bonds endogenously to satisfy the typical financial program. Given this fact, 
countries that intend to reduce budget deficits must accept cuts in 
discretionary government spending and/or raise t~xes. If taxes are not raised 
or spending is not cut, budget deficit targets cannot be maintained. 
Appendix: Dynamic Stability 
The dynamic path is examined by linearizing the behavioral equations, the 
money supply rule, the government budget constraint, and the real budget deficit 
target in the neighborhood of the unique steady state equilibrium. Differential 
equations system (Ai) and static equations (A2) and (A3) are obtained from 
equations (1) - (8). Denoting vector transpose by T, the following notation is 
adopted: 
x 
T 
= (k,c,m,q,b) x = x - x * x = d/ds(x). 
(¢+ot) / (1- t) -1 o o o 
c Em*J2 o o-F(D+Em)* c 
* o om = Fm m (Ai) 
q o q(¢ + B) o 
* * *Fb*+Rf'/q* b-bJ-B/q* - Bb /q - B 2 2 
* * * * 
,;here D == Uc/U ' E == Ucm/U ' F == (1-t)f', f" = d/dk(f'(k)), and Ji'scc cc 
(i = 1,2) are evaluated at the steady state values. The solutions obtained for 
(k,c,m) are then used to solve for r and ~ in the follo,;ing equations. 
r 
A 
= Fk
A (12) 
7r = J1c+ J 2m - r. (A3) 
The triangular structure of the coefficient matrix in the differential 
equations system (Ai) shows that t,w eigenvalues are: - B (negative provided 
B> 0) and ¢ + B (positive). The remaining three eigenvalues are obtained from 
the top left hand side 3x3 submatrix, ,;hose determinant is negative while the 
trace is positive. Hence the 5x5 differential system has exactly two negative 
and three positive eigenvalues and is a regular saddlepath if, and only if, 
there are exactly two initial conditions. Private consumption (c), price of 
bonds (q), and the price of goods are endogenous and capable of instantaneous 
jumps. Nominal money and the number of bonds are instantaneously predetermined. 
Although their real values may take on any value at the initial date, the jump 
in the price level cannot alter the money-to-bond ratio and this imposes one 
initial condition. The inherited capital stock k (the outcome of previous o 
investment decisions) is a second initial condition. Thus, under budget deficit 
and monetary targets, endogenous issuance of bonds and lump sum t~~es or 
discretionary government spending, the economy is characterized by a regular 
saddlepath and it proceeds along its unique self-fulfilling forward-looking 
convergent path to the steady state from the initial date on. 
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